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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

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DEPARTMENT MAY BE INTERESTED IN HAVING AT THIS TIME RESUME  
OF VIEWS GENERAL NORSTAD HAS EXPRESSED CONCERNING MISSILE  
BASE IN TURKEY.

WHEN GENERAL NORSTAD WAS IN LONDON FAREWELL VISIT, HIGH  
OFFICIAL OF BRITISH GOVT RAISED WITH HIM OCTOBER 23,  
DAY AFTER PRESIDENT'S SPEECH, POSSIBLE DESIRABILITY OF  
TRADE OF TURKISH MISSILE BASE FOR SOVIET MISSILES IN  
CUBA. TO THIS SUGGESTION GENERAL NORSTAD RESPONDED WITH  
EMPHATIC AND CATEGORIC "NO".

SUBSEQUENTLY, AFTER KHRUSHCHEV'S SECOND LETTER PROPOSING  
SUCH A TRADE, GENERAL NORSTAD EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS IN  
EFFECT BY POSING SERIES OF QUESTIONS. THUS, HE ASKED IF  
MISSILES IN CUBA WERE ON SAME BASIS AS THOSE IN TURKEY.  
THE ANSWER CLEARLY WAS NO. COULD TURKEY BE TREATED AS  
A SATELLITE EVEN IF KHRUSHCHEV APPARENTLY HAD PLACED CUBA  
IN THAT CATEGORY? AGAIN ANSWER WAS NO. GENERAL NORSTAD  
SUGGESTED FURTHER THAT ACCEPTANCE OF KHRUSHCHEV PROPOSAL  
WOULD BE TAKEN AS SIGN OF WEAKNESS. IN ANY CASE, HE DID  
NOT REPEAT NOT CONSIDER THAT ACCEPTANCE COULD CONTRIBUTE  
TO STRENGTHENING OUR LONGER RANGE POSITION. HE ASKED IF  
ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSAL FOR TRADE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT  
INDICATE THAT THREAT OF MISSILES POINTED AT U.S. COULD

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-2- 2082, NOVEMBER 11, 6 PM FROM PARIS

FORCE A WEAKENING OF NATO DEFENSES UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE, WHEREAS MRBM'S SITED AGAINST EUROPE HAVE STRENGTHENED OUR DEFENSE AND OUR RESOLVE. LASTLY, GENERAL NORSTAD ASKED WHAT WOULD BE EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSAL ON GREECE AND TURKEY, BOTH OF WHOM LIVE IN CONSTANT FEAR OF BEING LEFT ALONE. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS INCOMPLETE LIST OF QUESTIONS, BUT THAT ANSWERS SEEMED TO ADD UP TO NECESSITY OF REJECTING KHRUSHCHEV'S PROPOSAL.

IN PERIOD SINCE KHRUSHCHEV BACKDOWN, GENERAL NORSTAD HAS COMMENTED THAT FOR U.S. ON ITS SIDE, IN EFFORT TO FURTHER DETENTE, TO RAISE OFFICIALLY QUESTION OF MISSILES IN TURKEY WOULD HAVE A SERIOUS MORALE EFFECT IN CERTAIN VITAL AREAS AND WOULD PROVE TO BE A MOST DIVISIVE ISSUE IN ALLIANCE. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THERE WOULD BE STRONGEST OPPOSITION, PARTICULARLY ON PART OF GREEKS AND TURKS, TO ANY CONSIDERATION OF WITHDRAWING MISSILES FROM TURKEY AS RETURN GESTURE FOR SOVIET ACTION IN CUBA.

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